The High Court has handed down judgment in Thampi v General Medical Council [2026] EWHC 1036 (Admin), an appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 against a decision of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service. The ruling refines the principles courts apply to dishonesty findings, sanctions methodology and procedural fairness in regulatory tribunals.
For solicitors handling appeals from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, the case is worth reading. Section 40 medical appeals and section 49 Solicitors Act appeals share much of their substantive law, and decisions on the medical side are routinely cited on the solicitor side.
What is the procedural context?
Appeals under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 are appeals by way of rehearing, conducted on the documentary record and any further evidence the court permits. The court can substitute its own decision, remit, or dismiss. The threshold for intervention on factual findings is high, particularly where the tribunal has heard live evidence.
The same statutory architecture applies, mutatis mutandis, to solicitor appeals under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974, and to barrister appeals from Bar Disciplinary Tribunal decisions.
What did the High Court decide?
Without trespassing on individual findings, the judgment of 1 May 2026 is notable in three respects.
First, on dishonesty findings. The court restated the Ivey v Genting test, emphasising that the tribunal’s task is to apply the objective standard to the facts it has found, and that an appellate court will be slow to interfere unless there is a clear error of approach.
Second, on sanctions. The court reiterated that the GMC’s Sanctions Guidance is a starting point but not a tramline. The tribunal must apply the guidance with judgment and explain departures. The same applies to the SRA Enforcement Strategy and SDT Guidance Note on Sanctions.
Third, on procedural fairness. The court considered allegations that the tribunal had failed to give adequate notice of certain factual findings. The judgment provides useful guidance on the level of particularisation required in regulatory charges.
What does it add to the law?
The ruling does not break new ground. It is a careful application of Bawa-Garba, Khan v GMC and the line of section 40 authorities going back to Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512.
What it does is consolidate. For solicitors preparing appeals or advising regulators on litigation strategy, Thampi is a useful one-stop summary of the current state of the law.
Section 40 medical appeals are routinely cited in solicitor regulatory appeals under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974. Thampi consolidates several recent strands of authority on dishonesty, sanctions methodology and procedural fairness in regulatory tribunals. Practitioners handling SDT appeals, advising firms on SRA enforcement, or sitting as adjudicators in regulatory contexts will find the judgment useful as a reference point.
What is the read-across for solicitor regulation?
Three points stand out for solicitor-side practitioners.
The first is the reinforced Ivey approach to dishonesty. The SDT applies the same test, and the High Court’s reiteration of the limited scope for appellate interference cuts both ways. Defending solicitors who succeed at the SDT level can take comfort. Those who fail face a steeper hill on appeal.
The second is the sanctions methodology point. The SDT’s Guidance Note on Sanctions performs the same function as the GMC’s Sanctions Guidance. Thampi‘s approach to departure from guidance is directly applicable.
The third is on procedural fairness. The level of particularisation required in regulatory charges has been a recurring issue in SRA enforcement prosecutions. The judgment provides a useful articulation of where the line falls.
For now, Thampi will sit on the regulatory appeals shelf alongside Bolton, Bawa-Garba and the recent SRA enforcement cases. The full judgment is available on Find Case Law.