Crispin Odey has dropped his £79 million libel claim against the Financial Times over its 2023 reporting of sexual misconduct allegations. His lawyers told the FT that he had been “forced to accept” the newspaper would likely succeed in establishing its public interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. The case offers useful lessons on the strength of the public interest defence, SLAPP concerns and the role of investigative journalism in defamation litigation.
The discontinuance marks the end of one of the most-watched defamation actions in recent years. It also leaves Mr Odey facing a seven-figure liability for the FT’s legal costs.
This case is highly relevant to defamation specialists, media lawyers, investigative journalists and anyone interested in the public interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. It also feeds into the broader SLAPP debate and the question of how civil litigation interacts with investigative reporting on matters of public concern.
What was the claim about?
The FT published articles in summer 2023 reporting allegations from women that Mr Odey had subjected them to sexual assault and harassment over several decades. The reporting was based on accounts from 20 women spanning around 50 years.
Mr Odey filed his libel claim against the FT in May 2024. He sought general damages and £79 million in special damages, attributing the collapse of Odey Asset Management to the FT’s coverage. He has consistently denied the underlying allegations.
What was the FT’s defence?
The FT pleaded two principal defences. The first was truth under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013. In support of truth, the FT relied on the accounts of 15 women who were prepared to give evidence at trial, including three whose allegations had not previously been reported.
The second defence was publication on a matter of public interest under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. This defence requires the defendant to show that the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of public interest and that the defendant reasonably believed publication was in the public interest.
Why did the claim collapse?
In a letter on a Friday afternoon in April 2026, Mr Odey’s lawyers told the FT that he had been “forced to accept” the newspaper was “likely to succeed in establishing” its public interest defence. The lawyers referenced the stress and cost of a three-week trial he had just completed in the Upper Tribunal against the FCA.
The discontinuance came two months after the FT served substantial disclosure of evidence it intended to rely on at trial. The decision is consistent with the cost-benefit calculation many libel claimants face when public interest defences are well documented.
How does the public interest defence work?
Section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 replaced the common law Reynolds defence. To succeed, a defendant must show two things. First, that the statement complained of was a statement on a matter of public interest, or formed part of such a statement. Second, that the defendant reasonably believed publication was in the public interest.
The court takes into account all the circumstances. This includes the steps taken to verify the information, the seriousness of any allegation, the nature of the publication and whether the claimant’s side was put. Courts are required to make appropriate allowance for editorial judgement.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23 confirmed that the section 4 defence is not the same as Reynolds. It is a wider statutory defence focused on the defendant’s reasonable belief at the time of publication.
What about the personal injury claims?
Five of the women who would have been witnesses for the FT’s truth defence are also pursuing personal injury claims against Mr Odey. The libel and personal injury claims had been case managed together, with a five-week joint trial of liability scheduled for June 2026 before Cavanagh J.
The libel discontinuance does not end the personal injury claims. Reports indicate that several of those claims have since been settled, although Mr Odey continues to deny the underlying allegations. The five women’s accounts had been central to the FT’s evidence in the libel action.
Does this engage the SLAPP debate?
The collapse of a £79 million libel claim against investigative journalism on matters of clear public interest will feed into the broader debate about strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPs. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 introduced limited anti-SLAPP provisions specifically in economic crime cases.
Whether Mr Odey’s claim would have been categorised as a SLAPP is a separate question. The case nevertheless illustrates concerns raised by media defendants about the chilling effect of high-value libel claims on investigative reporting, even where strong public interest defences exist.
What are the practical lessons?
For media lawyers, the case underlines the value of thorough verification, careful documentation of editorial decision-making and willingness to identify witnesses prepared to give evidence. A robust section 4 defence is built well before publication.
For litigation lawyers advising potential libel claimants, the case is a reminder of the high bar where investigations are well sourced and witnesses are available. Disclosure can shift the practical calculus substantially. Claimants face significant cost exposure if a defence is likely to succeed.
For investigative journalists, the FT’s approach demonstrates the protective value of rigorous methodology. Roula Khalaf, the FT’s editor, described the outcome as a vindication for investigative journalism and for the victims whose accounts were reported. The disclosure process and the women’s willingness to testify were central to that outcome.
What happens next?
The FCA appeal at the Upper Tribunal is awaiting judgment. Mr Odey is challenging the regulator’s decision to ban him from financial services, with a ruling expected in the coming weeks. The outcome will be relevant to public interest in regulatory transparency in financial services and to the broader debate about personal misconduct in regulated industries.
The wider lessons for solicitors, journalists and regulators continue to play out. The case shows that defamation litigation does not always end at trial, and that disclosure can be decisive. It also shows that investigative reporting backed by careful methodology can withstand even very high-value claims.